Why River Song's Ending Is Darker Than You Thought



Steven Moffat is one of Doctor Who’s most controversial writers due to his mind-bending twists and chaotic narratives. But what you may not know is that Moffat told a MASSIVE lie when it came to the fate of his iconic character River Song…

Forgot to clarify in the video but the Soma game footage comes from https://www.youtube.com/@superbestfriendsplay

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41 thoughts on “Why River Song's Ending Is Darker Than You Thought”

  1. 13:17 Technically, the 'original' version of the Doctor would've ceased to exist after the first time a teleporter gets used in Classic Who (the earliest instance I can think of is the Doctor + companions going from space station to Earth between Ark in Space and Sontaran Experiment)… so from that perspective, the show left the original behind AGES ago.

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  2. I strongly disagree. Real people were downloaded and then were brought back. In my opinion, it’s the same with River, except she can’t come back because she’s dead in the real world.

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  3. "By all the laws of the universe, you cannot….” travel in time. You need to just enjoy the story. This fiction is densewith deus ex machina, which is famously embodied in the sonic, and reversing the polarity… 
    You know, like when you read a book, the story is in your head, therefore the emotions you feel are not valid? Hyperbole, indeed.

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  4. It's even made clear within the episode that they are digital copies and not the original people, because there's that whole "transcription error" plot point with Miss Evangelista

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  5. What happens here and in Soma is almost exactly like what happens with Testimony in Twice Upon a Time. Maybe you should make a follow up video that talks about what was said and done in Twice Upon a Time.

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  6. We tell this lie to ourselves in similar fashion, and share these "lies" with one another throughout our lives — If silicon stores digitized sentience, so do engrams in brain cells, and return to us "copies" of lived experiences, over time. But not to the "we" we once were — but to the "regenerated" beings we've become — beings distinctly different from the "Who" we once were! Not only do these brain cells die (many times), the very location of our memories migrates (over 10+ years!) as new life continuously alters past perceptions while our brains work to consolidate these stored experiences. So, are any of us truly "us"? Or are we not all various Ganger "ships" of Theseus of TARDIS? What are "we" if not a combination of lived experience and transcription error, alike? Something "ineffable" and "in the Now", perhaps — like Thich Nhat Hanh's perfect words, " Even now, I'm still arriving? " (Don't ask me … ask me tomorrow when I'm someone else!) Perhaps the Biggest Lie, then, is that we're all running around looking for an "original"; one that doesn't exist, when in truth, we're all "copies of copies of copies", as programmed as wafers ever were. –If so, then we're surely no less "noble" for the best of these efforts. –Perhaps we're like a certain wandering Physician… constantly healing, constantly re-inventing and "re/membering" ourselves? Or maybe we just love a good yarn to pass the Time?
    Well, you know the line: "Who knows?" 🟦

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  7. There's one likely defeater to this paradox: Destructive Mind Uploading. Where the brain is destroyed and gradually replaced with exact copies of the neurons. Usually with nanobots in the way I usually explain it. This creates a proper ship of theseus as at any given time, the brain will be part organic part technology, never causing stream of consciousness to end. At any given point, a neuron is 'copied' sure, but then it's immediately altered by the continued communication with the original brain. No gaurantee it would work perfectly safely, but it theoretically does beat this paradox.

    Moving into Sci-fi, especially Doctor Who, I see no reason why this cant be essentially performed instantly for River's death. I also disagree that Silence int he Library is meant to be seen as a happy ending. It's Bittersweet.

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  8. I think your argument is conflating a philosophical thought experiment with a hard fact.

    You can argue that if you believe in this philosophy, everyone in the library died. But at the same time, opposing opinions could argue that consciousness alone is all that is required for life. Neither of these stances are more factually correct than the other

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  9. If you apply the theory to the Time Lord's Matrix then even The Master and Rassilion we see in New Who are not the originals we see in classic who, being revived for the Time War

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  10. You are also not the same person you were a mere second ago.
    The problem in the Soma example is, that there is a version of you that diverges from you. The instant after being copied 1:1 they start having different experiences, their bodies and minds are subjected to different environments; even if you copied them side by side, one would see their "twin" left to them, the other two their right. Miniscule, but different.
    Since we are assuming the copies are 1:1 to the atom, the ship of theseus does not apply. Your parts are not "replaced" if they are "the same". But the original did die in the classic "transportation". You are however as much that person as them, within the instant of the copy, until you – obviously – live on. But in that regard you are also not who you were before, ever, even if that previous self of yourself did not technically die.
    I remember there a sort of philosophical debate regarding laws and punishment raised, wether or not a person should really be punished to their past mistakes, especially years after the fact, if they are not (exactly) the same person as when the crime was committed. How does personhood and identity apply over time? It's the same philosophical issue here. Heck, even biologically the argument could be supported – your very cells keep dying and being replaced all the time as you live. That is the ship of Theseus!
    But a perfect copy, living on in the original's stead? If the ship and person are the same even as they keep growing, experiencing, getting bit by bit replaced, then the same would apply to a perfect 100% copy living on.
    However, as far as purely digital copies go, another argument could be made about them now being something else, even if they themselves do not experience it as such (raises questions of mind and body cohesion, perception vs. physical reality). And once that mind (if it had VR experiences) is put back into a body that is a reset version of when their original body died / diverged, it may even be yet another different thing, the mind diverging from the body even at the instance of insertion. But if that means again they are a different person depends on whether or not you see yourself as a different person from last week, mentally.

    It is a very interesting thought experiment. But also very complex and digs deep into the question of identity and personhood.

    As far as the Doctor himself, if he hadn't himself pointed out that it was a fancy 3D printer, I would argue the timelords had the ability to constantly and over and over grab him from a point in time. But but was clear in the show that this wasn't the case. Do we even know what happened to his original body? Did it dissolve?
    As yet another from of "transportation", he would coming out indeed be Doctor 2.0 and not Doctor some million point 0. He kept being reset… Or, well, he would maybe be Doctor 2.some million… Different sub-versions had existed and perished, until one of them lived on, kept on diverging due to existing and became his own new self – a self, yes, that the original newer got to be. But nonetheless the "same person" as we generally perceive personhood day in and day out…

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  11. Have to argue with the rest on this one, while the philosophical questions are unanswerable the point as I see it is: it kindness to do nothing or kindness to do something? I had problems with Moffat's idea of no one actually dies from time to time but episodes like this I was happier with, still lasting consequences in the real world but the doctor could still be kind knowing some form of their consciousness was happy irrespective of what the actual afterlife is.

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  12. I strongly disagree. As far as I'm concerned what makes you you is your thoughts and memories – your mind. So a perfect copy of you is just as much you, as the original is. If we look at Star Trek teleporters where the explanation for how it works is that it scans you, and then builds you a whole new body from scratch at the new location then we either have to conclude that nobody in the entire series is actually who they think they are, or since there is literally no difference between the person before and after the teleport then they must be the same person.

    And yes they are now technically made from different atoms, but you replace all the cells in your body naturally over time anyway so… are you no longer you because there is no longer any original cell in your body? Or are you still you, and therefor so are all these "copies" that you're arguing against?

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  13. Will always wonder what Moffat's real story was…

    The God Complex: "Do you know, there's a planet whose name literally translates as Volatile Circus?"
    Volatile Circus = RAM Disk.

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  14. You missed out the second part of the ship of Theseus. If you took all the original planks and sails and rebuilt them in the exact same way they once were, is that the original ship of Theseus or the one that has been rebuilt and replaced?

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  15. 'romantic deception based around happy endings' implies there is an intrinsic value to life and we aren't just all glorified chemicals, the Doctor is practically immortal and out of time, his mentality is likely like Rick Sanchez', that any version may as well be the original because the difference is arbitrary, the only difference between this river and the last river is that this river doesn't have a physical form but that probably means little in terms of a Time Lords definition of life.
    Them not being the literal same entity feels like a less important variable in the definition of a life and than the experiences that individual holds when looking at it through this lense.
    Human beings invented the concept of life to help explain and categorize the complex biological chemical reactions that exist 1000000000000:1 on our planet, and on an universal Sci-Fi scale, what is a more consistent definition of death, if your place in the grand reaction ends, or if your form changes part way through?
    Consciousness is just a chemical process, just because this process is being reformed, does that make it different?

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  16. At the end of the day does it actually matter? Physically we are already a Ship of Theseus because our cells replace themselves. Mentally we become someone new every time we create a new memory.

    You now are different from the you 10 years ago, or even 10 minutes ago. Meeting another you on the street doesn't mean you have met you, just someone very like you.

    Basically a River Song lives and that is good enough to make me happy. No-one needs to have an existential crisis over it.

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  17. You call River's happy ending the dumb technicality, but I see calling it fake as much more of a technicality. She died and then essentially got revived in a digital form, from her point of view she simply got put there. She is River Song, she harbours the same memories and experiences, thoughts and opinions, loves as her. That's all we really are as humans. It's just her. There's no lie at all.

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  18. I don't agree with your use of the word "paradox". Since you said they were copies, then which paradox?
    Doctor who, the library, "it's only half a life"
    About the death of the doctor, he's dead everytime he REGENERATES. Memories and basically the same, different tastes and behaviors, 🤔🤯

    Thing is in Star Trek, murderous transporters disintegrate you into a data pattern and sending you to destination then you materialise there. Converting you into particles is killing you! In realistic physics, you can't do that of course, but it's a great deal of energy to reconstruct you!

    Even in STTNG, there was a duplicate commander Riker because the transporter did it because wibbly wobbly 🤔🙄

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  19. I think it boils down to a difference in philosophical opinion. Whether or not the new entity is a continuation or separate creation of the previous version depends on what it is that you think matters. Particularly whether matter matters. Or if consciousness requires the specific matter to exist or is it the pattern of processes that the matter undergoes that matters.

    If the matter matters and the uniqueness of the copy matters we should also take known physical laws into account. What if instead of the physical arrangements of atoms isn’t good enough. What if we require quantum state to be copied as well?

    Then we run into the No cloning theorem of quantum mechanics. Teleportation of quantum states requires the destruction of the original. It’s not possible to create a true duplicate. Think Star Trek and not The Prestige. (I know there’s a couple episodes of Star Trek where duplications actually occur but those episodes violate quantum physics so we can discount duplicate Rikers, for instance.)

    So everyone experiences a piecewise linear stream of consciousness with no branches or copies. So other than the occasional superstitious doctors who distrust transporters, no one in that universe is concerned that the physical matter has been swapped.

    After all, we all are ship of Theseus examples. No one dies made of the same matter they were born with unless they die in infancy. We’re constantly replacing atoms of our bodies with atoms from our foods, drinks, and breathing.

    So, was it the same River in the Library computer? If the Library transporters copied quantum states then it’s quite possible that the Library isn’t just copying a model of the mind but running a quantum model of the teleported person’s body. That’s great for Donna at least because her existence is pretty much a continuation of her physical existence.

    Miss Evangelista, is a different story. She wasn’t actually teleported. She was a distorted copy of a neural link which I don’t think copies the neural quantum state. That’s a much shallower copy and perhaps explains why she was able to exist in a distorted state. The No cloning theorem doesn’t apply there. So that’s a different philosophical situation to consider. How much of you is required to still be you?

    I’d argue that a lot of what’s necessary to maintain a mind in a body is not necessarily relevant to that mind. It may have impacts sure. Neurons need to metabolize proteins to reassemble amino acids into the enzymes necessary to make things like neurotransmitters. But if a completely different platform is capable of producing the same stream of consciousness without metabolizing proteins, does that really matter? Computer science considers two computers identical if they both produce identical outputs. The implementation details are irrelevant. Perhaps there’s an equivalent with regards to consciousness?

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  20. The data ghost of River Song isn't the real River Song herself. It's a copy of the real River. A simulation, an entity which her personality, consciousness, memories and her physical form is duplicated into digital data. Like Arnold Rimmer in Red Dwarf.

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  21. Jesus, this is some high school 'i heard about philosophy' level stuff.

    The 'Dark Truth' is that YOU are not Harbo 1.0. you're not even Harbo 2.0.
    You're about Harbo v120046.0

    Because every night, and in some cases during the day as well, your consciousness shuts down, and is restored from backups. This is called 'sleep.'
    You also are not even the same version as before, as your subconscious edit your memories, loses stuff, and misconnects stuff.

    So the reality is, River Song is no LESS the same person in a simulation, than she is when she wakes up in the morning.
    Every 7 years or so, you are a person who shares not one atom with the person you were 7 years ago.

    And yet you continue on. Because what makes a person is their identity, which is a function of their memories and thought processes.
    And THAT is what was preserved for River.

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  22. This might be an issue in the "real" world, but it's very clear that the Who universe is a DIGITAL world in which fictional characters think that they;re real. This is clear back the old Who episode LOGOPOLIS. Not only that, but consider that everything after THE BIG BANG is universe version 2 {at least}.

    And even more than that, the very idea of regeneration is that of a NEW BODY with the SAME MEMORIES, just like those so-called digital copies.

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