The Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the Ukrainian war as the unchallenged master of that body of water. Ukraine’s own fleet was small and less modern, and the opening weeks of the war were dominated by news of the Russian fleet launching missile attacks and threatening naval landings that pinned down Ukrainian forces in Odessa.
But when the Moskva sank, the pattern of naval activity changed dramatically. Now, the Russian fleet stays mostly away from the Ukrainian cost, nervous of missile, drone, and air threats posed by an opponent whose own navy is mostly neutralised.
In this episode I look at the evolving war in the Black Sea, the evolution and role of the Russian navy there, the sinking of the Moskva – and what if any lessons foreign observers might be taking from the war at sea so far.
Patreon:
https://www.patreon.com/PerunAU
Caveats:
The sinking of the Moskva, for all that we have learned, ultimately remains a mystery. I have not interviewed any of her crew, and I am not an expert in the field. I have tried to explain why I adopt conclusions on some matters and decline to make any on others – but even the conclusions made are only at a moderate confidence level.
There could have been more missiles, there could just have been some horrible freak accident involved. The comments therein are thus ultimately the best I can make using the evidence available – but as with so many other things in this war, I expect future evidence will reveal twists we do not now anticipate.
I’d also note there are a few typos that snuck through on the slides – forgive these please.
I’d also like to flag that the use of ground based systems at sea is not an unknow – though it is usually intended as an expedient. In some cases the ships involved may also merely have been transporting the systems, though that does not seem to have been the case in all instances.
Russian naval operations are obviously secret and knowledge presented therein is based on open source information – it is, for example, possible that Russia launches secret incursions against the Ukrainian coast, but the situation described is based on the best available information I have access to.
Finally – yes i know it’s a stretch giving the Canadians credit for the Brits torching the White House , but the joke was there
Sources/notable articles:
Russian fleet strengths – composite but primarily Military balance 2021
US accelerating deployment of laser weapons for navy ships
https://news.usni.org/2022/07/26/cno-missile-attack-on-russian-warship-moskva-moved-navy-to-speed-up-laser-defense-for-ships
Weapon supply data drawn from open source aggregators – including Oryx and official sources, E.G for Germany
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992
Russian navy and PLAN recognition Guides
https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia_Ship_Silhouettes_2021.png?ver=hrKOr75XjW5QYQzVwlVkhw%3d%3d
The Sinking of the Moskva by Christopher Carlson
http://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/pdf/His2022_Sinking_of_Moskva.pdf
Russian claims on Moskva’s sinking:
https://tass.com/russia/1438045
Turkey closing the straits:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkey
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkey
Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:01:15 — What Am I Covering?
00:02:07 — Evolution of the Russian Navy
00:03:00 — Land and Sea Powers
00:04:14 — The Rises and Falls of Russian Naval Power
00:06:07 — Gorshkov’s Navy
00:07:16 — The “Soviet Style” of Ship
00:10:00 — The Cost of Firepower
00:11:22 — The 90’s
00:12:53 — Putin, Modernisation, Syria & “Kalibrisation”
00:14:45 — Pre-War Strength
00:15:46 — Russian Federation Navy Recognition and Identification Guide
00:16:13 — The Early Stages of the War
00:16:22 — Russian Fleet Strength
00:18:31 — The Opening Salvos
00:20:27 — End of the Ukrainian Navy
00:22:22 — From Snake Island to Odessa
00:24:32 — The Moskva Moment: A Moment That Captured Global Attention
00:26:53 — The Soviet Rustbuckets
00:28:36 — How Did It Happen?
00:30:33 — Moskva Under The Microscope
00:32:51 — State of the Ship
00:35:01 — Incompetence or Arrogance?
00:37:16 — What Did It Mean?
00:38:07 — What Happened?
00:40:19 — Emerging Threats
00:40:39 — The Missile Threat
00:43:27 — Drones and Air Threats
00:44:54 — Networked Intelligence
00:46:24 — What Next?
00:47:10 — Unmanned Systems Introduced
00:49:21 — The Crimean Dimension
00:50:15 — Force Regeneration
00:52:13 — Lessons & Observations
00:53:56 — Paper vs Actual Capabilities
00:55:36 — Soft Factors
01:01:19 — Nowhere to Hide
01:02:27 — Conclusions
01:04:01 — Channel Update
source
many thanks to everyone as always, sorry the release was a few hours late.
And before I cause an international incident over a joke – I'm aware that it was the Brits who burned the White House during the war of 1812, not their Canadian allies….but let's all give them a little team credit eh?
my guess is corruption/greed weakened them from within, ya?
another reason for all the extra electricity is because the ships can be used as a power plant.
extremely well done video. I'm a new sub.
The biggest problem in Russia (apart from the thieving elite,) is that their industry is pretty basic. They lack any form of advanced industry and especially electronic industry is.missing. They need the West for all advanced tech.
"Bullshit that protects reputations during peacetime can cost lives during wartime." Imma save that one. What a simple statement to sum up Russian operations in this war.
45:24 anyone else see that red path of Forte11 constantly moving upwards when you focus on it? trippy.
I would argue Napoleon did not sack Moscow. The Russians sacked Moscow for him.
I’ll be—this could be a caterpillar.
I’m sure American warships are also more vulnerable then people are willing to admit.
With respect, Perun, there is a glaring issue with your discussion of Moskva and her assumed capability. On paper, she was very much was heavily vulnerable to a raid of two AShMs like Neptune – simply for the fact they were sea-skimmers.
Slava/Moskva is a very old ship even by naval standards, being only laid down in 1976, and much of the design's development dating back to the late 1960s and early 70s. She has been refit several times, but she has never received a comprehensive upgrade to her air defense capabilities, either SAMs, radar suite, or the CMS behind it. This is vitally important because her primary means of air defense – S-300F – cannot engage sea-skimming cruise missiles (it's engagement floor is about 25 meters, while sea-skimmers can fly at 5-10 meters – or less). S-300FM is the evolution of the system that can handle sea-skimmers, but that was only ever used by the Kirov-class CGNs and the Slava-class never received it in upgrades.
Even if she had been in perfect working order, she wasn't really capable of handling such a threat due to the limitations of S-300F, and the other layers of her defenses weren't really up to it – Osa-M just isn't very capable in the first place, but in any case the system did not receive the ability to engage sea-skimming threats until the Osa-MA-2. Again, not something that was installed on Slava/Moskva. Beyond that, her AK-630M may very well have been the only one of her hardkill systems that on paper could have engaged a missile like Neptune.
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To be clear, this doesn't meant that – assuming it was operating to the full of its potential – Moskva was useless at sea. S-300F may not be capable of engaging sea skimmers but it's still going to be plenty useful against aircraft, helicopters, or drones. And she was likely deployed with this well in mind, because the Russians did not seem to believe there was a credible AShM threat at the time – even if the Ukrainians had the coastal missile batteries assembled (at the time, it was an open question if they had managed to yet build any significant numbers of Neptune missiles), setting up an engagement against a ship at sea would be difficult. They probably assumed it wasn't really a risk and deployed the ship accordingly.
Adding to this, it also has to be recognized that they didn't really have the platforms to escort her. Admiral Grigorovich and Admiral Essen were the only other Russian ships present in the Black Sea with a serious air defense capability, even if only a short-ranged one (Urgan/Shtil-1, aka naval Buk). They are more than capable of defending themselves, or ships immediately local to them, from a raid of sea-skimming AShMs – but, there's only two of them. It very likely just wasn't considered as reasonable, by the VMF, to tie one down with escorting Moskva any time she was deployed, given the threat they would be covering her from wasn't likely one they considered too seriously. It would be a major operational constraint, after all.
Thank u i have attended your classroom, I have learned quite a lot about deterrence and capabilities and also preparations, meaning drills being ready in the true sense, thank you EL🤗😎 PROFESSOR
Just wanted to say, and I could be wrong here… I thought the Ukrainian flagship was undergoing some kind of modernization, refit or repairs(IDR) and wasn't due to be finished until like next year. Now obviously the scuttle still would have been to early but if that was the case it would make a little more sense.
Taiwan's submarine SS-791 Hai Shih was comissioned in March of 1945 and still in service. With proper maintenance warships can last.
Ha, ha, ha: the Moskva had a "holy relic"? It was probably a fake by the cigarette-patriarch.
Maybe the drone went out there to see if they could get lucky and harass the Moskva, realized none of the defense system's were being operated effectively, and quickly had the land based missiles that happened to be in range react.
You'd be surprised what even small asms can do…given the right conditions. Damage Control fittings that aren't properly maintained are basically useless and I know alot of navy's take the easy way out when it comes to ships survivability where as the US Navy is absolutely obsessed with them…for instance in some ships I've seen water tight door density is per 50 feet of space or more…in the US Navy I believe it's 20 feet with every ladder well moving up and down below the main de k requiring a watertight fitting. This is why American ships are so hard to sink and based on what this video discussed in regards to doctrine I can guarantee that water tight density is not present on Russian ships as it becomes cost prohibitive quickly and if the fittings were degraded what was there would pop like a shaken up soda bottle.
Another excellent video. And shows the limitations of "ultra realistic simulators" like Command: Modern Operations. The assumption that weapon platforms perform fully according to paper specifications.
The Soviet naval doctrine was actually the modernization of the German maritime philosophy for the previous World War with main submarine raiders and auxiliary surface raiders, where the last one should be not artillery cruisers but air carriers task forces.
I'm sure the British were mainly responsible for burning the capital building and presidential house.
"Well in that case, why dear God, was this ship out there…"
Maybe it'll shock you, but to anyone whose served in the US military, this sounds all too familiar. Far too often, "NMC" and faulty equipment is "circle 'x'd" and taken to the field. It doesn't make the news as often, and I can't give you any statistics, cuz I'm sure no one in the military is compiling this data, but anytime you hear "lost in a training accident," odds are it was due to faulty equipment. Could it be "incompetence" on the part of the user? Absolutely, but that's no excuse. Competent NCOs should be training their Soldiers to use the equipment properly, much less how to service them. If the NCOs aren't being allowed to fulfill this essential role, than that's on leadership failing to support their NCOs. OR, its also leadership–under pressure to advance their careers–that they feel forced (or complicit) in advancing orders to place such equipment they know to be faulty into the field; putting the lives of their Soldiers at risk.
Regardless, there will always be immense political top-down pressure to put into the field any and all equipment. This is not unique to the crew of the Moskva. It happens in Western militaries too. We just don't pay as much attention to it.
What is the black sea fleet flagship right this second? That is not BadaBoomed?
Russian arrogance and pushing of Moskva to “Show of force” off coast. As an older NTDS tech of 80s Navy I was on Ike during med cruise around Libya and Lebanon, alertness, training and more training were the daily routines, constant repair of aging electronics never ending, having had a ship that was ignored maintenance wise during the fall of the USSR would take some serious time and money to repair, looking at current Russian maintenance examples I suspect the Moskva was in poor condition and poor readiness, which puts the sinking somewhat on Russians hands, Ukraine just caused damage.
clearly the russians didnt learn a lot
🤣I like the printer comment as you talk about conscripts using the complicated AA system
It's on the point as it's no question of intelligence when people are unable to use them.
Feels like this video was one week too early…
every time perun uploads a video on the war, a significant development happens
The first time I heard this story, I instantly didn't believe Putin's version of events. I realized that Russians were so desperate to make sure Ukraine didn't get a 'victory' at that time, they'd make up some story of them just being incompitent since incompetence was already in massive abundance in the russian operations.
What I didn't realize at the time was how devastating to the moral and operations it was for the rest of the Russian navy. They didn't WANT to engage anymore. They were scared. The story that it was incompetence means they could still engage Ukraine, but the story that Ukraine could sink them… well that was a whole different matter.
The photos of the warfighting terminals look like old CRT SAGE radar stations. Is that typical in modern ships?