The Drydock – Episode 226



00:00:00 – Intro

00:00:52 – Is it safe to say that WW1 Dreadnoughts were more stable than a WW2 Battleship?

00:06:11 – If the RN had made the fusion design and had a 25 knot battle line from before the US started it’s Standard classes do you think the Standards would have still been 21 knots?

00:12:26 – Changes in the Divisions of the Grand Fleet?

00:19:01 – Battles significantly affected by the weather?

00:24:46 – Were the Indiana-class pre-dreadnought battleships really as bad as some sources say they were?

00:29:30 – Given the insane luck HMS New Zealand had, and given the Navy tradition of naming ships after lucky/successful predecessors, why has there never been another HMS New Zealand?

00:33:21 – Why was the force at Gibraltar called “Force H”?

00:36:48 – What were the Courageous class for?

00:46:46 – To the best of your knowledge, would the Anglo Japanese alliance have survived into the 1940s if it was not broken up by treaties?

00:53:12 – What’s the most horrific Darwin Award from the Pacific theatre of WW2 linked to the use of naval aviation?

00:57:07 – Why did the French 13″ gun have a longer barrell life than the Italian 15″ despite having a higher muzzle velocity?

00:59:40 – What would you recommend to read about the reasons and the events of the British naval decline after the second world war?

01:01:56 – Why did SMS Lubeck had multiple screws on a single shaft?

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47 thoughts on “The Drydock – Episode 226”

  1. Re Rebuilding the Royal Navy it is an excellent book and even has a chapter on both the wartime legacy and the reconstructions of the wartime ships as well as explaining the fate of the Malta class

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  2. My understanding is Congress saw US battleships as a coastal defense force and specifically over ruled extra speed and range. They did'nt want the Navy roaming the worlds oceans. They could also operate with coastal fortifications.

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  3. Thanks for your reply to my question about Courageous. I am satisfied that Furious was intended as a test bed for the 18". The design was in hand, could be built quickly, and, was large enough to carry the 18" guns. Since posting that question, I found a letter on The Dreadnought Project: Fisher to d'Eyncourt, saying words to the effect that the Baltic operation was "the story we will use to sell them to Cabinet", which makes it sound like the Baltic op was not what Fisher really had in mind, but only an excuse to build them. In that letter, Fisher also says having the draft be 22 1/2 feet or less was imperative. The draft was the only parameter laid out in that letter that Courageous missed, by a wide margin. Renown's draft was some 5 feet less than Revenge, but Courageous' draft was only some 14 inches less than Renown, so hardly seems worth the bother. I tried redesigning Courageous in SpringSharp to see if I could get to that 22 1/2 foot draft. Could not make the hull any flimsier, so replaced the two twin 15" with three twin 9.2" turrets borrowed from Lord Nelson pre-dreadnoughts, to reduce weight. Only reduced the draft to 24 1/2 feet. It could be a matter of Fisher seeing those unused 15" turrets and deciding he would see them used, for something, other than a monitor, and Courageous was what he came up with, to have the turrets put to use, much as the construction of Vanguard was due to the availability of those same four turrets.

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  4. Theory on the courageous class: what if they were intended as fast monitors for Mediterranean use? Having a heavy gun mobile fire support that isn't a dreadnought or even pre-dreadnought could be quite versatile for keeping Ottomans or Austrians on the defensive and this free up capital ships for elsewhere.

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  5. The greater barrel life of the French 13” v Italian 15” may be due to propellant burning cooler. The 15” uses 16% more propellant to drive a 58% heavier shell at almost the same velocity. Thus the energy of per unit weight must be much greater. This suggests that the Italians used more nitro in their propellant therefor more heat. Heat weakens steel. If you compare USN charges straight nitrocellulose to RN charges Cordite the RN charges are smaller, in fact I fact I believe at least one RN gun was switched to USN propellant and about 50% more propellant was required to produce comparable performance and chamber temperature was lowered. The Italian rifling quicker by 20% and of course barrel life is subjective, how much wear is too much.

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  6. wrt the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the version I have read was that the alliance was intended to use Japan as a counterbalance to both the Germans and Russians in the Pacific. Germany purchased the Spanish colonies in the Pacific that the US had not rolled up in 98, including the Marianas, less Guam, the Carolines, and Palau, adding them to their existing colonies in the Marshalls, New Guinea, and other islands around the Bismark Sea, in 1899. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in 1902. Japan rolled up the German colonies in WWI, and was given a mandate to hold the former German colonies north of the equator by the League of Nations. So Germany was no longer a threat to UK interests in the Pacific. The Soviets were still securing their position in Russia, so they were not much of a threat to the UK in the Pacific. I am thinking the Anglo-Japanese alliance had outlived it's usefulness to the UK. Additionally, having rolled up the German colonies, there were not many directions Japan could further expand it's empire, without bumping in to European interests. China was about the only independent nation in the area, and even there, the Japanese ran into European business interests. What was there in eastern Russia that would attract the Japanese? There is significant oil and coal production in eastern Russia now, but what was there in 1920, that would attract Japanese interest?

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  7. wrt the question of barrel wear between French and Italian ships. Drac touched on it at the last moment, the quality of the steel used in the gun. I was reading Friedman on WWI naval weapons recently. Friedman mentions a couple things: the quality of the steel, and the combustion temperature of the propellant. British analysis of captured German guns after WWI showed the Germans were using much higher quality steel than the UK used, which enabled much greater barrel life. Estimates were that the German guns cost 5 to 6 times as much to build as British guns, but the superior material lead to much greater barrel life. The lower combustion temperature of the German propellant was another contributor to barrel life. That being said, I have noticed that the barrel life for German guns on Navweaps is in line with UK guns, so I am not sure about who is right.

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  8. 59:40 – I'd suggest to that questioner to read some books on finance and the economics of the UK at that time. The country was flat broke at the end of WW2, indebted up to its eyeballs. There was the tremendous expense of rebuilding damage to the nation (Blitz, V1, V2, etc) consuming a large chunk of resources. Add to that shifting priorities in the post WW2 nuclear age where a chunk of what money the nation did have was diverted to the UK nuclear program from the conventional forces – and that stuff wasn't cheap. Use the known US expenditures on the Manhattan Project as a rough guide. Look up Hurricane (the UK Trinity test) and the subsequent history of the UK program and note what must have been the magnitude of the expense from the late 40's into the 50's. Grapple was the UK test of their thermonuclear weapon in '57. Oh, and once all this development happened, then there was the expense of deploying it all – not only the weapons, but think the cost of the bombers and subsequently missiles and all the related supporting infrastructure. All this had to come from somewhere and I suspect that the Royal Navy took its share of the hit to its budget to fund all of this new stuff.

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  9. Hi Drach, all the best to you and your family for the Christmas holidays and happy New Year. Regarding cruiser and Battleship catapult aircraft, did these actually serve a useful role in WWII? Were there any documented use where these aircraft actually contributed to scouting or being a forward observer to correct gunfire in a engagement?

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  10. Re: French 13" .vs. Italian 15": I wonder how much of the wear and tear is due to difference in powder blends. Some smokeless (civilian) powders of the 1930's were known to cause erosion at the end of the chamber…  

    Perhaps the Italian blend burned hotter to get the velocity causing this erosion.
     
    Another possibility is tolerances as well as metallurgy, if you're a bit oversized on the shell and/or the driving and rotating bands this will cause issues. As will harder metal for both bands. Not to mention, if the rifling and grooves are out of spec., either at the start of firing, or as the barrel heats up the rifling protrudes further into the bore and starts hitting the steel of the shell .vs. both of the bands…. bad juju!

    Last possibility is the Leade/Throat, which is the area between the end of the chamber and the start of the rifling. (I'm lumping the two together.). The greater the distance between the first part of the rifling to touch the bullet or shell the higher velocity and lower chamber pressure you have 

    Also, does the rifling start at a shallow angle (harder to make) or a sharp, almost 90 degree angle to the bore?

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  11. Feel I need to weigh in on the question around the 50:00 minute mark or so in reguards to Japan and their allies, or lack there-of in regards to the naval treaties.

    It's worth noting that the burgeoning Russian Socialist Government under Lenin and Marx, the burgeoning German Socialist Government under Adolf Shicklegruber, the burgeoning US Democrat party of Jim Crow laws and segregation, the burgeoning British Socialist Lords that implemented Apartheid, and the burgeoning Italian Fascist (transliteration of Communist via Greek Phakelos for "Bundling together") party that came to a head under Mussolini had far more of an impact on relations with Japan's leadership than can be simply attributed to the naval treaties alone.

    It is not a secret that in the lead up to the outbreak of WW2 the National Socialist Party of Germany considered the British Lords, the US Democrats, the Soviet Marxists, the Italian Fascists, and the Japanese Fascists to be strong allies. To the point that the German National Socialist Leadership has a number of strong ties in the forms of letters, personal appearances, international holidays, and letters of intent on trade matters with the Japanese, Russians, British, Americans, and Italians.

    So? What happened? Why didn't these powers come together?

    The big factor in the United States was the Republican Party and practitioners of the Christian Faith who were already fighting back against the Democrat's… leaving Japan uneasy that the promised alliance under the Democrat party could not come to fruition.

    Likewise in Jolly Old England the opponents of the British Lords (aka the lower members of Parliament who weren't gifted with a lifelong seat in government) likewise fought back against the practices of the Lordships.

    The ability to recognize socialist tyranny, and stop it earlier on, was certainly a factor in Japan deciding that a strong alliance with the German National Socialists and Italian Fascists were the best ticket to forcing a submission on the United States Republicans… and eventually pressuring the British Lords to sign an alliance as well.

    The important question to ask yourself when framing the decisions of each country can be simplified down to two simple statements:

    Socialism is the Ideology where those who Control the Means of Production are NOT responsible for the means of production.

    Capitalism is the ideology where those who Control the Means of Production ARE responsible for the means of production.

    We can clearly see that the US Democrats, the Soviet Marxists, the German National Socialists, the Italian Fascists, the British Lords, and the Japanese Empire… all wanted Power. They all wanted to CONTROL the populations… and tell others what to do… And especially true in the US Bureau Of Ordinance… none of them wanted to be responsible for their actions.

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  12. 24:46 I was curious to how long 300 cubits was, and it works out to 450 ft. Looking up the Connecticut-class battleships, which you mentioned had the same length-to-beam ratio as the Ark was described to have had, I was amused to learn that they were 456 ft long. That's actually hilarious.

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  13. DRACH… During a ships fighting time in WW II, huge amounts of AA Guns would be added. But ships have finite space and much if not all of that space was apportioned out to equipment, etc. while building… Where the heck did they find room for all the additional crew to man those additional AA guns, radars and all???

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  14. Book recommendation for the decline of the RN: 'The Age of Invincible' by Nick Child. Focuses on carriers but the first half gives an excellent overview of the politics and economics, as well as the geopolitics and strategic imperatives. It does this so as to set the scene, explaining why the UK ended up with small STOVL carriers instead of CVA01. An excellent read.

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  15. The story of the disintegration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was primarily a product of the 21 Demands, not the naval treaty system. The forces that were building since 1914 that eventually forced the Japanese by to withdraw from Tsingtao in 1922 and turn over the former German exclave to the Chinese despite the UK continuing to hold the Royal Navy base in Weihaiwei throughout the 1920s effectively killed the alliance long before Washington demanded it on paper.

    Japan conveyed their 21 demands in secret to Peking/Beijing in January 1915, which essentially would have turned China into a Japanese vassal. The Japanese were taking advantage of the perceived British weakness due to the stalemate on the Western Front, versus to the victorious Japanese that had taken Tsingtao and all of the other German possessions in the Pacific that had not been seized by Britain or France. But Beijing outmaneuvered the Japanese, simply going public with the demands which drew the ire of the Americans.

    The 21 demands would have ended the Open Door Policy, which had existed in a de facto form since the Opium Wars but explicitly since the Americans had proposed the free trade zone to prevent a Scramble for Asia and resulting colonial wars in the late 1890s. The Wilson Administration had no desire to change the status quo, and Britain worried that Section 5 of the demands could threaten its positions in Hong Kong and Weihaiwei. This forced the Japanese to abandon Section 5, and the final agreement between the Chinese and Japanese gained Tokyo not much more than ill will in London and Washington with white-hot hostility from the Chinese closer to home.

    The Japanese ham-handedness severely damaged their position in the Versailles negotiations, and drew such ire from the Americans that they sided with the May Fourth Movement, an anti-Japanese protest movement begun by Chinese students in Peking on 4 May 1919, leading to the Chinese in 1922 gaining nominal sovereignty over Shandong Province for the first time since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 despite Versailles ceding control of Shandong to Tokyo.

    The Japnese decision to agree to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930 is quite bizarre given how Japan's imperialist aims were withering under the glare of the Anglophone countries, but the Depression of 1920-21 smashed Toyko's finances and threw them into a lost decade. The entire world was undergoing the sharp economic contraction since January 1920, but Japan never experienced the Roaring Twenties according to Hikaro Saijo in The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics Volume 8 Issue 1 of 2008:

    "Japan experienced a decade-long economic stagnation throughout the 1920s, and output fell below trend by about 20% in 1931 (Figure 1). In 1932, output began to recover and came back to trend by 1940."

    Japan REALLY couldn’t afford its fleet plans, let alone its imperialistic expansion plans, until after seizing Manchuria in 1931; but its desire to dominate Asia expressed in the Twenty One Demands did not die in 1915, 1919 or in 1922. Rather it bubbled on a slow burner, turning the Japanese into a people seething with anger who eventually decided to try to take over Asia AND the whole of the Pacific.

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  16. I have read that the Courageous class were designed to provide scouting in the North Sea during rough weather. The smaller cruiser would lose significant speed in rough sea limiting their ability to perform scouting duties. The larger size of the Courageous class allowed to remain stable and maintain speed in the rough north sea. The shallow nature of the North Sea caused a rougher surface. The Furious does not appear to have a clear purpose. One reason published was they were going to be part of an amphibious force project to open a new front along the German coast.

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  17. I missed the community post, but if you were to one day start releasing shorts I’d suggest creating a separate channel for the purpose. That way fans who don’t want to deal with shorts aren’t bombarded with it in their recommendations to quite the same degree.
    On a side note, the occasional fun Fridays video consisting of a compilation of clips of the various rants, jokes, and sarcastic comments from the channel and potentially the podcast would be fun. I’m struggling to think of an example from the channel, but the bilge pumps rant about procurement delays to the type 83 would be a prime candidate if the podcast were included.

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  18. It was only in mid-WWII that the problem of not being able to tell one ship's fire from another at the same target was solved by the British when they adopted the French "K" shell modification using colored dye bags in the APC/CPC ammo windscreens with high explosive shell nose fuzes and boosters in the tip of the windscreen to cause a bright colored flash and puff of colored smoke when the shell hit either the water or, a benny, also the target. The Japanese and the US in WWII kept the dye bags that colored the splash on water impact only in the windscreens, which did not work at night or with even moderately poor weather.

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  19. Is there any use in overkilling the thickness of barell walls aka make them very thick, much thicker than an optimal value to resist a shooting stress? Will the barell die slower? Will it affect maximal lenght of a barell?
    If your technologies are good enough to make long 15 inch guns for example, is it useful to make your 11 inch guns thicker (maybe as thick as thr 15 inch guns) to increase it’s lifetime?

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  20. Nice drydock. A book that might be of interest about post WW2 RN, is Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Penguin originally published in 1976. It focuses on the economic and social conditions. In 1914, the RN roughly had a quarter of total government spending due to the war and dreadnought arms race. By the 1920s it was down to 5-6%

    Kennedy is both a serious historian, and a popular one (popular works, Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in WW2, Yale University Press, Engineers of Victory, Random House, 2013, serious: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 1989.)

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  21. Alright captain, it's WW2, your carrier has lost all engines, you lash your aircraft to the flight deck and full power all engines…
    Do you move?
    Yes it's silly,… none the less.

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  22. Hi Drach,

    Sometime ago you graciously answered my question about forming ad hoc air groups from the scout/observation planes of large warships. In that vein I stumbled across this tidbit from the U.S. Naval Institute Blog: "About the first of December the PT’s received welcome assistance from half a dozen SOC’s–Navy scout observation planes. The SOC’s had been carried aboard cruisers damaged in the many actions around Guadalcanal, and were left behind with orders to work with the PT’s when their cruisers left the area for repairs." Seems to me in that approximate 40 year period when amphibious single engine planes became feasible to long range radar and helicopters, Scout Observations planes were tempting but difficult to employ beneficially unless an efficient doctrine was strictly adhered to. I'll post the URL in a reply to this comment (in case URLs are blocked).

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  23. @Drach
    Your explanation/word choice at 6:05 suggests (to me) that it would be possible to make a ship *too* stable.
    Is that correct?
    (a simple yes/no would suffice – no need to turn it into a future dry dock question😊)

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