While the Battle for North Africa was raging on in early 1943, Allied leaders were meeting in Casablanca to decide on their next target. Their decision would result in one of the most contentious episodes of the Second World War – the Italian Campaign.
Despite Churchill’s claims, there would be no easy victory. Instead, the fighting would be fierce and bloody, with places like Salerno, Anzio and Monte Cassino going down in history as some of the toughest battles of the War.
In this new three-part series, sponsored by Company of Heroes 3, we’ll be taking an in-depth look at the Italian campaign. From the invasion of Sicily to the capture of Rome, we’ll explore the key moments and decisions that shaped the fighting and try to understand was it really worth it?
This video is sponsored by Company of Heroes 3: https://www.companyofheroes.com/en
Explore and licence the film clips used in this video from IWM Film: https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/mycollections/index/3517 and https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/mycollections/index/3540
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Americans were strategically naive. They said the Med was a side show. Gaining full control of the Med was vital. It freed up a large volume of vital shipping that had to sail around the Cape to Suez and the Far East. The equivalent of sailing half way around the world. Now they could sail through the med via Suez. It also kept the Axis away from the magic oil in the Middle East.
What US historian Harry Yeide wrote of what the Germans thought of Patton:
▪ for most of the war the Germans barely took notice [of Patton].
▪ on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton’s momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
▪ There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton’s enemies had any idea who he was at the time. Likewise, the immediate postwar accounts of the German commanders in Tunisia, written for the U.S. Army’s History Division, ignore Patton. Those reports show that ground commanders considered II Corps’s attacks under Patton to have been hesitant, and to have missed great opportunities.
▪ In mid-June [1943], another detachment report described Patton as “an energetic and responsibility-loving command personality”—a passing comment on one of the numerous Allied commanders. Patton simply had not yet done anything particularly noteworthy in their eyes.
▪ But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.” Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.
▪ General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’”
▪ The commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel, aimed a dismissive, indirect critique at Patton’s efforts at Bastogne, writing in his memoirs that the Americans did not “strike with full élan.” The commanders who fought against Patton in his last two mobile campaigns in the Saar-Palatinate and east of the Rhine already knew they could not win; their losses from this point forward were inevitable, regardless of the commanding Allied opponent.
▪ the Germans offered Patton faint praise during and immediately after the war.
▪ posterity deserves fact and not myth. The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to Allied intentions. Hitler does not appear to have thought often of Patton, if at all. The Germans considered Patton a hesitant commanding general in the scrum of position warfare. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.
My late Dad was in the Sicily Landings with the Surrey Yeomanry after fighting in North Africa. He always talked about the fruit and water in amazement having been in North Africa. God Bless all
So this was bigger than d day ?
Kinda neat to see the dueling coordination problems on each side– Germans butting heads with Italians, Americans not getting along with the British. Alliance management is a cruel mistress!
How about this? You SKIP Sicily altogether. The Allies had air and sea superiority. Block the Strait of Messina and you trap 100,000 German troops on the island, with almost no loss of life on your side. The trick was to land at the toe of Italy–not that difficult given the land and sea superiority mentioned above. You have airfields within a few hundred miles and more than enough planes and ships to blast any German attempt to flee the island. Patton was one of the worst generals of the war–or any war. All he knew was striking the army and land in front of him. Another example was the Hurtgen Forrest in Europe; he could have gone around that slaughterhouse but pushed through, suffering many unnecessary casualties (of course, he was never in danger of becoming one of his casualties, the movie notwithstanding).
Attempting to invade North West Europe in 1943 would have been an absolute disaster considering the lack of build up, the lack of integration between British and US forces, the lack of intelligence etc. Stalin was demanding some kind of second front, the only practical options in 1943 were Italy or Greece.
Odd title. Husky was the largest amphibious op up to that point but an order of magnitude smaller in terms of troops compared to Overlord.
Samuel E. Morison gives much credit to the USS Brooklyn’s fire support in repulsing the Axis armored counterattacks at the US beachheads.
Monty & Patton’s bickering is a fart in the wind compared to the German evacuation from Sicily in the face of Allied naval supremacy. The USN and RN weren’t lacking for battleships or aircraft to protect them
Great docu. The problem with the Allied invasion was that they should have landed on the foot of Italy instead. Then they would have isolated the 150.000 German soldiers on Sicily. Now they had to destroy them, costing a lot of lives and time.
General Alexander before the battle: "Americans can't be trusted with carrying out the main advance. Give Montgomery the objective of Messina 😏"
General Alexander during the battle: "Why has the 8th Army stopped? What do you mean the southern route to Messina is blocked? Just push the Americans aside and use their roads instead 🧐"
General Alexander after the battle: "The only reason the Germans managed to escape was because Patton didn't stick to the plan and stay in his lane 😡"
Operation Overlord is the largest amphibious invasion of WW2. Please change your title.
Are you sure that your videos should be sponsored by a video game?
@6:35 – The reason white and black stripes were painted on all tactical planes in '44.
I want to add, that surrender of Italy and two milion men italian army had powerful impact on WW2. Germany was forced to send 40 divisions, which were re-created after Stalingrad to defend Italy and occupy southern France, Yugoslavia and Greece. These divions were previously ment to be send to estern front. Soviets were able to rush into Ukraine thanks to that. So invasion of Sicily drasticlly change strategic situation of Third Reich.
Some might say that Montgomery would still be amassing his forces of Patton hadn't just shoved on around.
The body of Major Martin actually came one of the many victims of mysterious sinking of HMS Dasher on the Clyde 27th March 1943 now lying in 700ft she was an US built Escort Carrier hence HMS Trenchant's epic sub voyage to collect a suitable corpse for Op Mincemeat and i met an ex US Ranger who had been landed at night 48hrs before Husky to scout out and were being hunted by the SS but were saved by the landing.
I have read that the Mafia in America had a direct line to the organization in Italy and they knew when the landings were to take place. Sabotage, assignations apparently took place and all kinds of mayhem ensured for the Nazis. It would be interesting to hear your take on this.
I believe you are incorrect. The largest amphibious attack of the Second World War was Okinawa. At 200,000 troops landing on the beaches.
What I can't understand is that you have recon jets. You can tell from miles out when there is an armata heading your way. How does Italy and Germany get surprised? Japan already had large amounts of troops ready for them on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.