✅ SUBSCRIBE / @ww2walkingtheground ” World War Two historians James Holland and Al Murray expose the flaws in the tactics of the British 1st Airborne division after they landed several miles east of Arnhem on the first day of Operation Market Garden, September 17th 1944. Al and Jim discuss the formidable challenges faced by divisional commander Major General Urqhuart to both protect the drop and landing zones for subsequent lifts and make a rapid assault on Arnhem to capture the bridge over the Rhine before German’s forces could react.
Other popular episodes of the Operation Market Garden series of Walking the Ground:
Riding on a Sherman for the 80th anniversary reenactment of XXX Corps:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mcey_GCQSw
What went wrong in Nijmegen: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ad9MJOhb1pQ&t=1s
John S. Thompson’s quick action at Grave Bridge: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dfA8T5yQoU
504th PIR’s epic Waal river crossing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8dybxqv4LM&t=2s
#ww2 #operationmarketgarden #almurray #jamesholland #ww2walkingtheground #wehavewaysofmakingyoutalk #dropzonetactics #battlefield #dropzone
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3:31 – "we are 60 feet above sea level here, you're not, south of the river, you're below sea level" – er, not quite – more like 79-92 feet above sea level, based on the 1943 military map of the area – that field you're in (Drop Zone 'X' west of Telefoonweg) has spot heights of around 24-28 metres (79 to 92 feet) above sea level, the datum on the contemporary maps state "DATUM MEAN SEA LEVEL AT AMSTERDAM" – probably because they were based on Dutch pre-war maps. The polder south of the Arnhem bridge was not BELOW sea level but still ABOVE sea level – the average spot height is about 10 meters, which is 33 feet above sea level, but the important point is that the rivers have to have Winter dikes because the polder they are protecting may be below the river level during the Winter floods.
In the Spring and Summer the polder and the river flood plains dry out, and in the Autumn and Winter rains they get soggy again, so in September they should still be quite firm. Glider landings on polder would still be problematic as the fields are small and defined by numerous drainage ditches, which would also hamper vehicle extrication and movement. The proposed and cancelled glider coup de main missions on operation COMET and provisional operation SIXTEEN would only involve six gliders each landing on the river flood plains close to the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges.
The Dutch get very particular about "Holland" being used inaccurately to describe the whole country, when it strictly refers to the provinces of Noord and Zuid Holland on the coast, which are mostly below sea level behind the protective dikes, so this situation of the polder being below sea level applies to Holland, but not the entire Netherlands. James, on the other hand, has to live with being a Holland wherever he goes in the world…
8:17 – "the Recce Squadron – four Troops of Jeeps" – was only three Reconnaissance Troops plus the Support Troop, because B Troop was destroyed in Italy in 1943 and not reformed. A Troop were to remain in Division Reserve on the landing zones (some of their Jeeps had failed to arrive, generating the false rumour many of the Jeeps had not arrived), leaving C, D and Support Troop to make the 'assault' on the Arnhem Bridge. Full details in Robert Hilton's excellent book, Freddie Gough's Specials at Arnhem (2017).
10:51 – "can't see any point in the Ginkel heath" – but there was nowhere else where you could land a large number of paratroops, because Landing Zones 'S' (1st Airlanding Brigade) and 'Z' (Divisional units) were full of gliders from the 1st lift, and Drop Zone 'X' was to be re-used in the 2nd lift as Landing Zone 'X' to bring in the 4th Parachute Brigade's glider element (2nd Anti-Tank Battery and 2nd Battery Light Regiment). The other zones not yet used were Landing Zone 'L' at Johannhoeve for the Polish glider element, too too small for the 4th Brigade, and Drop Zone 'K' south of the Arnhem bridge, which needed to be cleared of Flak and power lines – not even ready for the Poles on the 3rd lift and had to be re-located.
12:45 – "do without it" – [the 2nd lift] – which is essentially COMET, or have the 1st lift arriving at dawn and the 2nd lift in the late afternoon of D-Day, which was the outline proposal for SIXTEEN – which was changed by Brereton and Williams at 1st Allied Airborne Army into the compromised MARKET plan, because they wanted all their flights to be in daylight to improve on their Sicily and Normandy navigation problems.
13:30 – Urquhart thought from the rumours that many of the Recce Squadron Jeeps had not arrived and thought he should get a full report from Gough and give him a new mission. The delays in retrieving some of the Recce Squadron Jeeps was due to some of the gliders overrunning their landing zone and going into trees at the end of the zone near the Wolfheze asylum. It took time for the whole Squadron (minus a few non-arrivals) to be assembled, but they did move off at 1540 hours, just 10 minutes after 1st Parachute Battalion moved off along the same route to northern Arnhem. The leading C Troop moved to the RV (most of the Squadron personnel dropped by parachute and the RV was in the NE corner of DZ 'X') at 1500 hours, the same time 2nd and 3rd Battalions moved off for the bridge, so it could argued that if the complete unit could have moved off at 1500 they might have slipped through before Krafft's SS battalion blocking line had formed. Bringing the Squadron in complete by glider would be quicker, but would use more gliders.
Krafft's report on the battle indicated his line was formed between 1515 and 1530, based on early reconnaissance reports the enemy were in strength in Wolfheze (South Staffords and Glider Pilots) and weaker to the south, so the timing was very tight and Krafft's troops north of the railway would only have been in position for a few minutes before the Recce Squadron attempted to pass through them. It was unfortunate that Krafft was in Oosterbeek at all and not in his barracks in Arnhem, because he was the only senior officer in the area to heed Luftwaffe 3.Jagd-Division (Deelen airfield) commander Generalmajor Walter Grabmann's warning that the fields around Wolfheze were ideal for airborne landings and reiterated this to Model when he moved his headquarters into Oosterbeek. Model dismissed these concerns, but Krafft had taken them seriously and had his two training companies moved out of Arnhem and camped north of Oosterbeek close to the landing zones.
Drop zone 'Y' is aptly named
I truly enjoy this series and the excellent, knowledgeable banter between these two. However, sometimes, it feels like James (in the smock) prematurely cuts off Al just as he's getting going. I wish he'd let him got a few seconds longer before interrupting him.
Really enjoyed the video mate gust been watching the movie desert rats
The argument for each of the parachute battalions taking a different road was that the roads were narrow – a battalion column would be strung out, a brigade column even more so.
Gentlemen you knowledge is unbelievable in this "Series"…..Long may it continue, thank you 👍👍👍👍
Excellent
It's so cool to see you guys walking the ground I drive past every week taking my daughter to school.
Thanks for the maps. Hellishly difficult to follow all the movements in all different directions otherwise…
Another factor that makes Ginkel heath a bad dropzone is that there were barracks containing german troops right next to it. Granted these were second rate troops, but they still made life difficult for the KOSB defending the dropzone for the second lift. The KOSB also didn't have enough men to secure the entire heath. So by the time the second lift arrived there was vicious fighting going on and the heath was on fire.
Had the privilege of talking to a K.O.S.B veteran of Market Garden. Even at platoon level they thought heading away from the objective ( the bridge ) was a mistake. Apparently on the first night of the battle they barely heard a shot fired, next morning the Germans got serious ( his words ). Still can’t understand why they didn’t just defend and use the original drop zones?
Why did they have to arrive at that time in the afternoon? Surely they could have arrived early in the morning ,when it was just getting light, rather than kick everything off in the afternoon? I know it had to be co-ordinated across the other parts of the Operation but an early start on a Sunday morning would catch more people off guard.
Home movie Oosterbeek, 18 September 1944
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_jODxujP9k
This series has taught me more than any other about Market Garden. The maps are critical in my understanding and the modern analysis around holding landing zones vs consolidating and attacking in force, not taking Nijmegen bridge, and worrying about the wrong parts of the battlefield has been fascinating.
I do wonder if it would have been better to wait to launch the Arnhem attack until a day or two after the first lift so that the Arnhem force could be moved in a single drop
Your videos have been great to watch and learn from. They have made me want to learn more about D-Day and Juno, Sword and Gold beaches. Market Garden was way more than I had thought. Thanks.
Plan might of worked if not for the wait for the 4th brigade.
This series has been so incredible. Just finished the podcast series going through it and have bought Al's book as a result. Thank you for giving me a new obsession lol
Wouldn’t it be better to send landing brigades into town and smaller paras battalion hold landing zones
RIP whitwell
Although Jim writes tremendous books, Als airborne and armour knowledge is second to none.😮. Your chats about armour in the Market Garden series show that there must be a gap in the market for TV on wartime armour whilst you walk around preserved examples and the drive them around.
Bloody Marvellous! Thankyou Guys 😉
The effing British public school system/network… that's what!
Brilliant as per uaual chaps ta!…….Carry on what!✌️
Good to hear "Zed"!
Zed… "Ell zed Zed!" …Bravo! …y' Pommie bastards!
THIS is a Battle you could've used a few Battalions of Diggers for…. ! …but we were busy, elsewhere!
Good show Al Murray… and that other tosser. Kidding! BOTH are wankers doing a Good Show!
Pete.
I understand the issues surrounding landing zones for gliders and the need to defend them in force if you have a second lift. What has always been incomprehensible to me is why a battalion or stronger wasn’t landed on day 1 south west of the bridges where the Polish brigade eventually landed.
If the drop zone works for a third drop why not a first drop?
These troops would have been closer to the bridge and would have at worst caused the defenders to split their concentrations in the Arnhem area.
Looking for the ideal drop zone isn't the problem, distance wasn't the problem. The problem was the time it gave the Germans time to react, create a defence line, harden that line and counter attack. Airborne troops are lightly armed with limited mobility, there was no way a brigade with diverse objectives were going to fight eight miles and capture a major river crossing. Time gentlemen that's what finished the Arnhem drop and the compromises that caused it when everyone gets a voice in an operation.
Nice action. 🌟
The germans despite heavy losses captured crete by
Landing close to targets!
Wouldn't they have been better landing south of Arnhem, closer to 30 corps, have specialist units take the bridge, i dont agree that the landing zones weren't the problem, of course they were a problem, element of suprise totally gone, Germans knew what there objective was very qiuckly and could counter.
I dont think we could field a whole fighting division today, never mind an airborne one.
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What were these areas used for originally? Farming?