American Bombers Were Bravely Attacking Hiryu And Soryu



(Midway Series, Part 5) Watch our video “American Bombers Were Bravely Attacking Hiryu And Soryu ” and embark on an immersive journey through the riveting memoirs of two distinguished aviators who played pivotal roles in World War II. Join us as we delve into the captivating stories of individuals who shaped history, sharing firsthand accounts from the front lines. Witness the strategic brilliance and sacrifices of those who led the first air strike on Pearl Harbor, commanded carrier air groups, and soared through the skies as dive-bomber pilots. Our exclusive series provides a unique perspective on a poorly planned and executed operation (Battle of Midway from Japanese Perspective).
Link of Playlist https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLGjbe3ikd0XHOEvJ_fiy9mB66QYTadhKc

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36 thoughts on “American Bombers Were Bravely Attacking Hiryu And Soryu”

  1. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is Part 5 of memoirs of Two Japanese naval aviators who participated in the Midway Operation and provided an unsparing analysis of what caused Japan's staggering defeat in this Operation. The first aviator led the first air strike on Pearl Harbor, commanded the Akagi carrier air group and later made a study of the battle at the Japanese Naval War College . The second aviator was one of Japan's first dive-bomber pilots, was aboard the light carrier Ryujo and later served as a staff officer in a carrier division. They were both key figures in the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War two.

    Here is the link of the playlist https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLGjbe3ikd0XHOEvJ_fiy9mB66QYTadhKc

    Link of Part 1 https://youtu.be/8039mt4fP6s

    Link of Part 2 https://youtu.be/9nYn80oJftk

    Link of Part 3 https://youtu.be/qosHnZF7Sns
    Link of Part 4 https://youtu.be/24WsZ5bWJZs

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  2. I cannot overstate how important a contribution to our history of this period you herein provide. Your narration is splendid and easy to follow, and I am thrilled to discover your channel. Thank you, so very much, for providing this.

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  3. So much concern about OPSEC, all the dithering about not knowing the position of the U.S. Navy forces, and the carriers were sitting in position near Midway, just waiting for the IJN to close.

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  4. The problem with this account is it seems to have a lot of "this is how it should have happened" . The problem is that photographic evidence from the B17 atack shows aostly clear flightdeck. With just a couple of fighters, probably part of the CAP. ehich seemes to mostly what was on the carriers flightdecks. The bombers of the fleet were probably below decks.

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  5. I always get a chuckle out of the Japanese thinking that the Americans were helpless after the first few waves managed to inflict 0 hits. Little did they know these were the rookie pilots who barely knew how to fly and didn't even have working torpedoes. They didn't reckon on the veteran Lexington crews, led by Dick Best (AKA biggest dick in the Pacific), who singlehandedly destroyed half the Japanese carrier force.

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  6. Interesting the observation that the japanese tactics were fully tuned to attack and because of that the reconnaissance part was neglected.
    This made me think that, perhaps, they saw these battles as duels but, in the vastness of the Pacific, it was more a hunt than a duel.
    In a hunt, finding your target is as important as killing it and, of course, in this sea hunt both sides are hunter and prey at same time.

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  7. As we listen to this and other stories we must remember that we have the benefit of hindsight. Even though the IJN carriers were obliterated, that result was not a foregone conclusion and it was a close thing. The IJN pilots and naval personnel were battle hardened veterans and the USN was still learning to fight.

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  8. The Aleutian attack was not a diversion. It was a compromise between the Japanese Army and Navy. The Army was concerned that the Americans would use the Aleutians to attack Japan's northern home islands. Therefore, the Japanese military decided to capture two islands in the Western Aleutians to safeguard Japan. It proved to be a mistake.

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  9. Besides inadequate attention to aerial searches another glaring deficiency of the IJN was in shipboard damage control. With their myopic focus on "attack…attack…attack" the best officers competed for slots that fit into the attack doctrine. Damage Control was considered a "lesser" and not a path for fast promotions. My understanding is that USN officers were pretty much all cross-trained and served at least part of their time in damage control.
    Along with better construction practices and materials this meant that US ships were able to absorb more punishment with better survivability than their IJN counterparts. At least in the opinion of this armchair admiral.

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  10. The Aleutian attack hurt the Japanese in two ways. First, it took forces, especially carriers, away from the Midway attack. The Aleutian carriers though were not the best carriers, older and smaller, they would have still helped. Second, the captured Aleutian islands, Attu and Kiska, proved hard to supply and defend. The Aleutian sector was a Secondary Theater and didn't have to be attacked right away. It could have waited.

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  11. Luck played a big part of carrier operations early in the war. The Japanese were very capable early in the war but the US Navy was learning quickly and growing in size. They became much more capable in finding Japanese fleets. Reconnaissance became much more effective once larger carrier groups became available. And mistakes in reporting sightings was common on both sides early in the war. Midway could easily have turned out differently. Same for Coral Sea where fleets moved blindly. Increased numbers of submarines also helped. During the later Layte Gulf landings there were still errors. Mainly the approaches of the central Japanese attack was not founded early in part due to the northern diversion force. US recon ability was vital once Japanese Kamakaze attacks began. Destroyer pickets were then used effectively with radar. During Midway submarines on both sides failed to spot enemy fleets in time. US attacks were also poorly coordinated but by chance produced a great opportunity for the carrier divebombers. While a significant number of carrier aircraft played no role.

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  12. In early June 1942 the Japanese were still basking in what they themselves called, "Victory Disease". This certainly clouded the judgement of the IJN planners and most of the lower ranks. In actuality the Japanese had not lost even one encounter with US forces prior to Midway. The Midway disaster was not fathomable prior to the actual battle. This disaster had occurred just six months after Pearl Harbor. The die was cast……

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  13. While this is an accurate and true tale of the happenings regarding Midway, nevertheless, I dislike videos of historic events with but a statis photo for the entire video. Videos typically show scenes of the events; this presentation does not.

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