Brereton and the First Allied Airborne Army – panel discussion
Panel Discussion
Part of our Arnhem Week series
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDG3XyxGI5lA_2tt2i7Qyx2n8dX3UnSRc&si=HTEWdwIUJ7uwuA6u
More Operation Market Garden and Arnhem content on WW2TV
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDG3XyxGI5lC1YWOzdiOJegS8zhzquTxO
More Airborne Forces content on WW2TV
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDG3XyxGI5lDIbR79A5ahpamNXG6J0Q_8
Also part of our 80th Anniversary Series
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDG3XyxGI5lCyOAGNszPdUOkA43dfSldX&si=bfIRjfLj4XKUcXds
In this panel discussion, we will talk about the reasoning behind the creation of the FAAA in the summer of 1944, command choices and the impact on the planning and execution of Operation Market Garden.
Jeff McGovern is a U.S. Air Force historian and was a soldier with the U.S. Army who served with the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division. Since 2016 he is also a Battlefield Staff Ride guide for U.S. military units stationed in Europe. He currently writes a blog that focuses on WWII Troop Carrier and Airborne doctrine and operations at: https://troopcarrier.blog/
Jeff’s previous appearance on WW2TV
D-Day 80 – The Planning, Preparation, and Execution of a Troop Carrier Command / Airborne Operation
https://www.youtube.com/live/hQgl9quNP7Q?si=0gR1E86fFfhnz3eS
James Daly is a historian and museum curator. James has previously published on the experiences of Portsmouth people in the First and Second world wars. He was inspired to write this series of books on airborne operations by the experiences of his grandfather, who fought at Arnhem with the 11th Battalion Parachute Regiment. Part of the curatorial team that developed the new displays at the D-Day Story in Portsmouth, James has also lectured to a wide range of audiences and appeared on podcasts such as We Have Ways of Making you Talk with Al Murray and James Holland. An Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and an Associate of the Museums Association, James lives and works in Portsmouth, United Kingdom.
James previous appearances on WW2TV
Wastage, Tuxedo and Wild Oats – Proposed Airborne Assaults during Operation Overlord
https://youtube.com/live/90hscwaC7kM
Before Market Garden – Operations Linnet and Comet
Mike Peters is a retired Army Air Corps officer with more than thirty years of military service. He is now a full-time military historian and Chairman of the International Guild of Battlefield Guides. Mike has published books on the Glider Pilot Regiment in WWII and the Operational History of the Army Air Corps.
Mike’s appearances on WW2TV
The Glider Pilot Regiment – The Formative Years and early Operations
https://www.youtube.com/live/KnDxxoezl18?si=TmgMu5hMQledmlFU
The 381st Bomb Group – 8th Air Force
https://studio.youtube.com/video/M6KAuZV22s0/edit
Proposed Airborne Assaults in the Liberation of Europe: Cancelled Allied Plans from the Falaise Pocket to Operation Market Garden by James Daly
UK https://uk.bookshop.org/a/5843/9781399036214
USA https://bookshop.org/a/21029/9781399036214
Glider Pilots in Sicily by Mike Peters
USA https://bookshop.org/a/21029/9781848846838
Glider Pilots at Arnhem by Mike Peters
USA https://bookshop.org/a/21029/9781473822795
Bomb Group: The Eighth Air Force’s 381st and the Allied Air Offensive Over Europe by Paul Bingley and Mike Peters
UK https://uk.bookshop.org/a/5843/9781612009605
USA https://bookshop.org/a/21029/9781612009605
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Another fascinating discussion. Paul, Jeff, James and Mile were brilliant on the panel – so much collective knowledge. Highly informative and entertaining.
Great job. A number of people said in the sidebar "I'll have to watch this again" and yeah me too. Great guests who really knew their stuff. With Market Garden, every day's a school day.
Great line up on this one Woody. Really excellent discussion 👍🏻
Hello Paul, another superb presentation with a panel of exceptionally talented participants. Question, I wonder if "impressing the Russians" was another motivation behind the Airborne Army? I suspect by 44, the post war environment was behind a few decisions.
Excellent panel and discussion. Thank you gentlemen
even if a few tanks got to arnhem the germans would have counterattacked with everything they had
This is a very knowledgeable panel that worked together very well to contribute from their individual perspectives and expertise. Paul skillfully facilitated the panel discussion such that the collective discussion was really valuable.
I always had the opinion that paratrooper forces (not simply "airborne" which included gliders back then which are now helicopters today) should have been under the Air Force (Army Air Corps/Army Air Forces back then), but tactically controlled by the Army while on the ground. We aren't landing in AF aircraft, but actually exiting them while in flight using a parachute (which is considered an "aircraft" due to it's capabilities in the air) to get us to the ground safely and quickly. Yes, we do act as conventional infantry forces, but the purpose of paratroopers is to come into an area from the air and nearly 90% of it is done through the Air Force as a joint partner. They run the show from the tarmac until over the drop zone, so it only made sense to put paratroopers under the Air Force with a unique joint relationship with the Army.
They got it wrong during WW2 when they decided to put paratroopers under the Chief of the Infantry. The Air Force was more than simply being transportation because the operation of parachute assaults effectively runs through them since they are the very instrument that made paratroopers work. Of course the Army would train us as ground combat forces, but paratroopers are a unique force that can fill a dual role as a conventional force and shock troops from a strategic standpoint. Just my .02 cents on the subject. Great video.
I wonder if we could do a similar panel discussion regarding the evolution of Army Group South with Pritt Buttar, David Stahel, Robert M Citino and Philip Blood.
From Wikipedia "Mitchell, now the Chief of Air Service, Group of Armies and de facto commander of all U.S. air combat units, made Brereton his assistant for operations on October 26. Brereton was promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel on November 1. Less than 3 weeks before the end of the war, he proposed a plan to drop members of the 1st Division on the German-occupied city of Metz, in what would have been the first parachute airborne assault. While Mitchell supported the plan, General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, shelved it."
What lessons did they learn from the Crete airborne invasion in 1940?
What an excellent, thought provoking discussion, cheers Woody.
Wonderful discussion. The question at 1:13 could be an episode in itself.
The disconnect that allows Typhoons and Thunderbolts to wander off elsewhere, to allow Eindhoven to get plastered and transports be attacked… while Allied tankers have to shuffle and scheme to defeat Panthers with Shermans and Cromwells… the AAA seemed to have a really good structure to deal with all this, to break down the 'silos', but it goes begging.
Jeff's comments just after, regarding Browning, are hard to refute. Understandable and human of the toffee Guardsman to want to get in the game. It is quite interesting how by mid 1944 the British Army were- to exaggerate a little- half battlefield virgins, while the veteran units had been thrown in repeatedly.
Thank you, this Arnhem series has been absolutely top-shelf.
Mike's point about Brereton being constantly shifted between roles because he wasn't great was well made. I've met so many like that in my work life, but the modern corporate waffle is that they are 'agile' 😁🙄RIght on with the presentation – I've barely begun but wished I'd caught it live. I have so many questions about Brereton who to me appeared to not grip OMG at all and basically went AWOL after giving initial his orders. I'm sure it will be addressed!
Great show, the panel is excellent
Time has flown by in this presentation. So many different perspectives considered.
A very interesting discussion which highlights some of the issues and complexities of Airborne operations.
This was a great discussion. Roger Cirillo said that there was a failure to attack the flak positions with air power before the drop, and that Brereton would have recommended this plan, but the operational planners didn't consult him regarding doing this. Paul do you have a view on this?
Thanks to all for your contributions. Great show. I'm curious if there would be enough "meat on the bone" to directly compare and contrast the airborne experience in the ETO and Asia-Pacific in a future exploration. Would complement existing airborne content.
The 2nd TAF thing will always puzzle me.
Wow. Awesome job bringing together such a knowledgeable panel. Well done everyone
Excellent , truly excellent show. Pity I missed it.
Regarding the discussion of who should command an airborne army, the U.S. had to figure out the same thing in the Pacific for amphibious operations. The decision was a parallel one: the Navy commanded the amphibious force until the Marines land. The Navy moved the Marines, provided fire support to the landings and provided the logistical support.
Fascinating look at First Airborne Army in Market-Garden with analysis of the 1:24:09 army command and the air plan. Complex issues handled with expertise and knowledge. Learned a lot about the operation
I think the debate about who to blame for Market/Garden's failures will be forever discussed, much like who was at fault for Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo being pinned on Marshall Grouchy, or Lee's failure at Gettysburg on the second day due to General Longstreet's slowness and disagreement with the plan. The epic nature of battles such as these will rank high in history as far back as the Trojan War, but will always come down to the very human endeavor that war is. One thing that stands out is the sheer bravery and conduct of the soldiers ordered to fight. We will always remember them as we attempt to pin down responsibility. This was a wonderful and objective discussion with excellent points made by each esteemed guest. Well done all!
43:40 – about Browning using 38 glider tugs for his Corps HQ on first airlift – it was an attempt to influence events on the ground after he had failed to do so in the planning. When his proposed operation SIXTEEN outline was handed over to Brereton and Williams for detailed planning, a number of changes were made by Brereton and Williams that Browning could not protest because of the LINNET II affair. A decision was made to make all flights in daylight, which deleted the double airlift on D-Day, which also put the Corps HQ transport back from afternoon of D-Day back to D+1. The decision also made the proposed dawn glider coup de main raids on the three big bridges (Browning deemed essential for COMET) beyond feasibility as they were too risky for broad daylight. Drop zones for the 101st Division south of Son and Eindhoven were also removed, so out went Browning's "airborne carpet" concept to help XXX Corps break through to the 101st on D-Day.
These changes prompted a request made by "the British" (I presume Browning) to Gavin to have a battalion dropped on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge as an alternative coup de main, and although Gavin told Cornelius Ryan that he toyed with the idea, he said he eventually discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. So if Browning decided at the last minute (as seems to be the case) to move his Corps HQ transport up from second to first lift, he has a motive in being concerned about the Nijmegen bridge.
The unit affected at Arnhem as a result of the change is not the Airlanding Battalion (2nd South Staffords) that was delivered in two halves, but some of the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery assets in terms of Z Troop (Division HQ defence) and the Battery's second line ammunition trailers and Jeeps bumped to the second lift. This prompted Urquhart to request more first lift gliders but was refused. Since the pressure on 1st Airborne Division from armoured counter-attacks did not build up until after the second lift arrived, and in fact AT gun ammunition (as distinct from PIAT) was not exhausted even by the end of the battle, because German tanks were wary of British AT guns, indicates that Browning (or someone who organised the change) knew exactly what they were doing.
A point to make about the South Staffords – their Phase 1 task was protection of Landing Zone 'S', and in Phase 2 they were to be Airlanding Brigade reserve in the Brigade sector of the planned divisional perimeter around Arnhem. Their LZ was not under any serious pressure during Phase 1, so after Hicks (as Division commander in Urquhart's absence) decided to release 2nd South Staffs as the logical choice to reinforce 1st Para Brigade in Arnhem before the second lift arrived, the leading companies had only just arrived in the combat zone of the western outskirts when the second half of the battalion caught up with them from the second lift, so it wouldn't have made any difference to the outcome of the battle in Arnhem at all if the complete battalion had arrived on the first lift.
People need to check the facts when they engage in what-ifs, and not assume the Staffords were affected by the change to the glider schedule, and they should also check for alternative motives before assuming Browning was on a jolly when he decided to take his HQ to the very place where operation MARKET actually suffered it's worst single point failure and arguably compromised the entire operation.
Sources:
Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in northwest Europe, 1944 (Roger Cirillo PhD Thesis, 2001 Cranfield University, College of Defence Technology, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis)
The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022)
1:06:40 – Mike makes a good point about the Reconnaissance Squadron Jeeps not being landed in the first gliders to arrive. I think this is because the order of landing was dictated by the doctrine that the Airlanding Battlions were landed first to secure the zones – and these battalions had their own organic anti-tank platoons as well, and then the divisional units landed next before the Parachute Brigade arrived.
His point about "half" (actually most) of the men in the Reconnaissance Squadron arriving by parachute is a question of efficiency – men take up space and weight on the gliders and most of the Recce Sqn Jeeps (those without trailers) were loaded two in each Horsa glider, and the weight limit was reached with just the drivers on board – there was no room for the full crews – who were all parachute trained anyway. It would be a waste of more glider and tug combinations to carry them by glider as well – and this comes after the discussion on Browning's 38 gliders… for which see my previous comment.
But I think there was a case for getting the Recce Sqn Jeeps on the ground first and in a larger landing field, because most of the delays in them starting out for Arnhem was not the parachute arrival of the crews but in extricating Jeeps from crashed gliders – some of them were well into the tree line at end of the 'Hamilcar field'.
1:19:54 – best quote from the discussion goes to Mike Peters for – "even on a discussion about Brereton he still manages to stay in the shadows" – how the hell does he do that? (I mean Brereton, not Mike)
Excellent!
In summary I see five main decisive factors in the way Market Garden turned out to be
1) The huge investment Allied militaries made to creting airborne forces. They were elite , had best manpower material and made up volunteers , trained and equipped for this kind of high risk operations. Marshall actually insisted them to be deployed way behind deep into enemy lines in France (like Germans did in 1940 and Allies tried in 1944 in Netherlands) before D-Day but Eisenhower realising that amphibious landing in Normandy would take a lot of time to relieve airborne forces , preferred more modest objectives for them in D-Day. But by 1944 fall , they became coins to spent in Eisenhower's pocket. When Allied advance to German frontier began to stall in September 1944 , to use entire 1st Airborne Army for exactly this kind of risky but daring behind deep enemy lines type operation made sense.
2) Allied drive or urge to ape Germans for daring risky and more importantly hasty , improvised and initiative taking operations whether in ground or airborne warfare. On that regard , Allied generals or statesmen were dazzled by utilisation of German airborne daring coup de grace operations in capturing key bridges and airbases in Netherlands in 1940 (actually only partilly sucessful , the bridges secured , airbases were mostly not) or invading Crete in 1941 (latter was so costly for Germans that there were no big airborne deployments from them afterwards) The problem is Allied generals and operational system whether French , British or American , was not improvised , initiative taking , oppurtunity exploiting , hasty improvisional way like German Mission Based tactical and operationsal outlook. It was Germans who were trained and drilled to make most of their resources and mission assets , create improvisational tactics , organisations and maneuvers to make most of an oppurtunity or deny a threat. Allied militaries operational system including airborne was much more Order Based Approach where first mission defined then all assets were gathered then dealt and distributed according to priorty. That took time and reharsal. That is why Operation Tonga , 6th British Airborne landings in Normandy especially on Caen and Orne bridges suceeded because it was being planned , updated and reharsed for six months while Market Garden was planned and organised hastily in one week with a shoddy air transport plan and lots of assumptions in a flexible and volatile front that changed constantly.
3) The character and operational thinking of First Airborne Army leaders and transport commanders like Brereton , Browning , Paul Williams , Arthur Teddler who could give more support from SHEAF , Leigh Mallory and 1st Airborne Division commander Roy Urqhuart were simply not up to job. Both Brereton and Browning were itching to go to with their vastly expanded commands before it was over to prove themselves in active service and post war vision of airborne warfare. So many post operations like Linnet I , Linnet II , Comet were cancelled , the morale was going down. At the other hand none of these men had actual airborne operation experience or truly grasped the main role and advantages or airborne warfare. Shock and suprise. So in order not to increase transport aircraft and crew losses , they forfeited shock and suprise and speed advantages in a mass daylight jump (unavoidable) , 10-15 km away from main targets which were bridges (avoidable) with transporting three divisions in three jumps in three distinct days lessening the deployment density of troops (avoidable if they found enough planes and determined to ignore the potential transport plane losses) , ignoring potential weather detoriantion ( before D-Day , weather forecast was always updated for SHEAF) , ignoring to deploy a coup de main party to capture for each bridge ( did no one look into Operation Tonga , capture of Caen canal and Orne river bridges on D-Day ?) , ignored the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps remnants at Arnhem , giving malfunctioning radio sets to British airborne due to hasty planning etc. Brereton was from Army Airforce so priortised to air transport , same with Williams who was determined to minimise transport crew casaulties and ignored the rest , Browning took 35 or so gliders to deploy his corps HQ in Nijmegen but not one to capture Nijmegen bridge in coup de main and both he and James Gavin priortised on Groesbeek Heights to prevent any attack from Reichswald a little bit too much but ignored main priorty target bridge. And Urqhuart was just a infantry brigadier who should have insisted to rectify these faults in planning or requested more time but did not do so due to his lack of experience in airborne warfare. German airborne generals like Kurt Student were previous German army officers who were transferrred to Luftwaffe arm so they were aware of priortising objectives and capturing them first with limited means as quick as possible. Brereton or Browning or Willianms were not.
4) There was also an over optimised Victory Fever in all Allied camps in the beginning of September 1944. Frenzied by overbombastic Allied press and media and home front and desire to end the war and its hardships quickly when victory seemed in reach (after five years of war) with just jumping and crossing Rhine river and war would be over image (a false one it turned out. But everyone was dreaming another November 1918 parallel when Germany pushed into Low Countries , it gave up) was irresistable. One last push and it would be over narrative in overoptimism that German Army was finished before the jump thinking also contributed shoddy planning and faulty assumptions.
5) Under all these factors and faults , it is actually impressive that despite strategic failure (due to failure to establish a Rhine bridgehed) , Market Garden achieved that much. At the end of operation in last days of September 1944 , a 58 mile (95 km) long airborne corridor deep into Netherlands all the way to Waal river was carved , the airhead estblished in Nijmegen and Groesbeek proved to be very valuable later for Allied offensive to Lower Rhine (Germans counterattacked here multiple times but repulsed in each try) , the corridor carved shielded and enlarged a buffer zone that protected Scheldt and Antwerp and this buffer zone was to be expanded to Maas river in later operations like Operation Pheasant. In addition airbases in Eindhoven were also captured that provided good deployment area for RAF and USAAF ( no British or American airforce chief complained Monty for that) Only post war revisionist history trend in 1970'ies after Monty's death and writing of Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far book that became a Hollywood movie which put entire operations as a skewered unmitigated disaster when in actuality there were many Allied gains. The public narrative of scorn and critism was left over on Montgomery (who was dead at time the book published and movie aired so he could not tell his version) who also had his own faulty assumptions about Market Garden but he also freely admitted them in his Memoirs that he miscalculated in 21st Army Group capacity to cross both Rhine and capture Scheldt at the same time and neglected to send his liason officers to First Airborne Army HQ.
Thanks panel and Woody. I'm definitely a " army " person so thanks for the explanation of the rudiments of combined arms coordination of the Western Allies. Thanks again Woody. X