It’s Reckless To Wage War Against America



(Japanese Submarine Commander Part 1) Watch our video ” It’s Reckless To Wage War Against America” and “Dive deep into the untold stories of WWII’s Pacific theater with our captivating video series. Journey alongside a remarkable submarine commander as he navigates the perilous waters of wartime Japan. Immerse yourself in the riveting details of Japanese submarine warfare and the cultural complexities of this historic conflict. Join us as we uncover the incredible tales of resilience and survival against all odds and embark on an unforgettable voyage through one of history’s most defining chapters.”
Here is the link of the playlist
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLGjbe3ikd0XHt1KU46Ux-8w8oAKH2U6JT

source

20 thoughts on “It’s Reckless To Wage War Against America”

  1. The author's extensive knowledge of geopolitical and worldwide economic issues is remarkable. As he himself states, he obviously could not have known all this at the time he is writing about. His willingness to learn it all later shows an active and inquiring mind, with a remarkable degree of objectivity. He has taught me a lot.

    Reply
  2. According to the video, Yamamoto realized Japan could not win a war of attrition against the United States. Instead, he hypothesized the Pearly Harbor attack blunting American naval and military power until Japanese occupation of surrounding territories would enable the Japanese navy to win a decisive battle.

    What was wrong with this?

    Firstly, it supposed that Japan would not be forced into a war of attrition when war came. And in fact, that's just what happened, and Japanese military power was ground down to powder in that war of attrition.

    Secondly, Yamamoto supposed that his Pearl Harbor attack would paralyze American military power for "six months to a year," enabling Japan to mop up resources needed from the south. And indeed Japan did run riot through the south, mopping up resources just as described by Yamamoto.

    But the Pearl Harbor attack wasn't decisive. It certainly stunned American military power, notably allowing the devastation of the Clark field air assets immediately after Pearl Harbor, the capture of the Philippines and southern resource areas. But it also greatly antagonized the United States people, who responded with unlimited support of WAR against Japan, and Germany too. That insured a truly mighty war of attrition which Japan was destined to lose. Roosevelt and his military leaders deserve great credit for turning the assets they had into overwhelming military power.

    And of course American carriers were absent from Pearl Harbor, and available to rather early challenge the Japanese navy at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. Yamamoto's theory that he had the time to build up impregnable defenses proved to be wishful thinking.

    Roosevelt's embargo gave Japan a choice —- knuckle under to the Americans or play a bad hand of cards, hoping to win a secure world empire against utter destruction of Japan by superior and overwhelming military power. They chose….. poorly.

    Reply
  3. At the end of the '20s and early 1930s, Japan had two large battles against their most feared enemy, the Soviets. And lost each time because the Soviets were more mechanized. By 1934, there was a recognition that Japan could not fight a winnable war against them so their leadership asked, "Who can we beat up instead? Britain's too weak in the Pacific – only the USA is strong enough to be a worthy foe." So that was the decision: America was too weak, too indecisive and Japan was willing to settle for a negotiated peace. Russia had too much industrization! (Talk about Japanese stupidity! This was all because the Japanese Army only 'knew' the Soviets – what was directly in front of them, and the Navy were the travelers and had first-hand experience of more nations, including the US. The only weakness was that American Press allowed greater exposure to American political and money-spending indecision. When the American Navy's late '20s 'relaxation' on ship-building occurred, the Japanese kept seeing this as 'weakness' that eventually 1934 bills didn't pass sooner. This spending bill generated the American carriers. The Imperial Navy recognized this and saw 1942 as the beginning of their competitive end in a shipbuilding race they'd never win.

    Reply

Leave a Comment